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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Health state utilities play an important role in
decision analysis and cost-utility analysis. The question
whose utilities to use at various levels of health-care
decision-making has been subject of considerable debate.
The observation that patients often value their own health,
but also other health states, higher than members of the
general public raises the question what underlies such dif-
ferences? Is it an artifact of the valuation methods? Is it
adaptation versus poor anticipated adaptation? This article
describes a framework for the understanding and study of
potential mechanisms that play a role in health state
valuation. It aims at connecting research from within
different ﬁelds so that cross-fertilization of ideas may
occur.
Methods: The framework is based on stimulus response
models from social judgment theory. For each phase, from
stimulus, through information interpretation and integration,
to judgment, and, ﬁnally, to response, we provide evidence of
factors and processes that may lead to different utilities in
patients and healthy subjects.
Results: Examples of factors and processes described are the
lack of scope of scenarios in the stimulus phase, and appraisal
processes and framing effects in the information interpreta-
tion phase. Factors that play a role in the judgment phase are,
for example, heuristics and biases, adaptation, and compari-
son processes. Some mechanisms related to the response
phase are end aversion bias, probability distortion, and non-
compensatory decision-making.
Conclusions: The framework serves to explain many of the
differences in valuations between respondent groups. We
discuss some of the ﬁndings as they relate to the ﬁeld of
response shift research. We propose issues for discussion in
the ﬁeld, and suggestions for improvement of the process of
utility assessment.
Keywords: adaptation, outcome, quality of life, utility
assessment.
Introduction
Health state utilities play an important role in health-
care decision-making and health economics. The most
important applications of utilities are in expected
utility decision analyses and in cost-utility analyses. In
expected utility decision analyses, the expected utility
for each possible strategy is calculated by combining
the utilities for all possible health states with the prob-
abilities of these states occurring [1]. Cost-utility
analyses use a speciﬁc application of utilities: that of
quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). QALYs are calcu-
lated as the area under the utility curve [2]. The utility
thus serves as a correction factor reﬂecting the quality
of life in spent life-years.
Utilities can be used at various levels of health-care
decision-making, and the level determines whether
they should be assessed from the general public or
from patients. In cost-utility analyses from a societal
perspective, for macro-level decision-making, Gold
et al. [3] have recommended the use of society’s pref-
erences, and utilities thus should be assessed from a
representative sample of fully informed members of
the general public. In guideline development, the meso-
level, and in individual patient decision-making, the
microlevel, the use of utilities obtained from actual
patients is preferred [3]. Gold et al. have qualiﬁed
these recommendations, basing their reasoning and
their recommendations on the assumption that health
state utilities will in general differ between patients and
the general public. They argue that it may be difﬁcult
to fully inform members of the general public of what
a state is truly like. In many instances, members of the
public who are asked to imagine experiencing health
states assign lower utilities to those states than do
patients who are actually experiencing these states.
Also (and possibly related to this ﬁnding), patients
often assign lower utilities to hypothetical treatment
scenarios than to the actual treatment states that are
reﬂected in those scenarios (see [4] for a distinction
between the various designs used to evaluate the
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differences between respondents). After patients expe-
rience adverse health outcomes, they seem to assign
higher values to those outcomes, despite the substan-
tial reductions in health-related quality of life that
often accompany these. These ﬁndings resonate with
those of the disability paradox: that many people with
serious and persistent disabilities report that they expe-
rience a good or excellent quality of life, when to most
external observers these people seem to live an unde-
sirable daily existence [5].
The observation of the differences in utilities
between respondent groups has led to the question of
whose utilities are most “well-informed,” and thereby
most valid for use at the different levels of decision-
making. The answer to this question will depend on
the reason for the differences. Are they because of
better understanding by the patients of what the health
states are really like? Or are they because of cognitive
mechanisms operating in patients during or after treat-
ment, such as justiﬁcation processes? Or, worse, are
they simply artifacts of the method, caused by, for
example, inappropriate scenarios?
All of these explanations have indeed been sug-
gested in the literature to account for the differences in
valuations between healthy respondents and patients,
and between patients before and after experiencing a
health state. The explanations come from such hetero-
geneous ﬁelds as medical decision-making, health-
related quality of life (HRQL) research, judgment and
decision-making, health psychology, and sociology.
Hedonic psychology, which has recently emerged as a
new ﬁeld that studies determinants of well-being and
the judgmental processes involved in reports of well-
being [6], may also be relevant in this respect. Valua-
tions of well-being are not similar to valuations of
health, but clear parallels exist and it is conceivable
that patients take their well-being into account when
assigning utilities to their health. Similarly, another
ﬁeld that has recently received much attention and that
may be relevant in explaining some of the differences
in utilities described above, is that of positive psychol-
ogy [7] in which concepts such as meaningfulness and
hope play an important role in determining quality of
life. Research insights from the ﬁelds mentioned are
seldom empirically linked to research in utility assess-
ment. This is not surprising, because in those ﬁelds the
ﬁndings may come from studies on topics as varied as
the federal states in which students prefer to live or
students’ preferred ice cream ﬂavors [8]. Moreover, the
research generally pertains to happiness or mood, not
to health state valuation. To date, most of the research
in utility assessment has been on improving the
response techniques, for example, on the correction of
probability distortion in the Standard Gamble (SG)
[9]. Little attention has been paid to the object of
valuation and the judgment processes involved in
valuing such an object. This article therefore presents a
framework for the understanding and subsequent
study of the mechanisms that may play a role in the
process of assigning a utility to a health state. It will
not provide ready answers to the question of whose
utilities are the most “well-informed,” because the
answer is quite involved, as we will show. In contrast,
the framework is an attempt to connect research
carried out within different traditions that all in some
way or other may relate to the issue of utility measure-
ment. Researchers from within a speciﬁc tradition may
not always read research published in journals that are
particular to another tradition. We aim to cross such
borders in the hope of stimulating a cross-fertilization
of ideas. The article does not pretend to be a systematic
review, since that would not be feasible because of the
broad array of topics from often seemingly unrelated
research. But it is to be hoped that it will point the
readers to journals and articles that they would other-
wise not likely have read. Some of the aspects
described have been discussed in the context of the
disability paradox by Ubel et al. [10], but from a dif-
ferent angle, and again, have not been applied to utility
assessment. Our article attempts to integrate issues
that have as yet seldom been studied in conjunction,
and thereby will point toward issues for further study.
It may provide support in indicating which aspects of
the valuation instruments and procedures should
perhaps be adapted, and which aspects should not be
deemed artifacts but are true aspects to be incorpo-
rated. Valuations that are valid for the purpose at hand
may thus be obtained. Finally, theoretical insight into
the process of health state valuation, and into determi-
nants of utilities, are not only relevant for the ﬁeld of
medical decision-making, but can be extended to the
ﬁeld of HRQL research, where many similar issues
play a role.
A Framework Describing the Steps from
Object Deﬁnition to Response
Our proposed framework is based on theories of infor-
mation processing (stimulus response models) from
social cognition theory. The process of health state
valuation can be seen as a series of steps from a stimu-
lus (the object of valuation or scenario) to a response,
the utility. The steps involve the cognitive representa-
tion of the stimulus, the interpretation of the informa-
tion, and the combination and integration of the
information into a judgment, which ﬁnally needs to be
expressed on some (utility) scale. In Figure 1 the
framework has been depicted. At each step, several
mechanisms may play a role that can explain differ-
ences in values between respondents (or groups of
respondents). In the following sections we will elabo-
rate on this framework. A qualiﬁcation should be
made regarding the sequence described in the model.
In reality the phases are not as clear-cut and linear as
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they may seem. For example, framing can be seen as
part of the process of creating the scenario, or as a
determinant of information interpretation. Further-
more, in the phase of information interpretation and
integration, judgments regarding the information are
already being made [11]. Nevertheless, in the section
on judgment we only wish to refer to judgmental
aspects of the global evaluation of the stimulus that
has been “perceived” in the process of information
interpretation and integration. The framework there-
fore has mostly a heuristic use, and serves to structure
the wide array of ﬁndings from the literature that may
be relevant to the differences in values of patients and
of the general public. Similar models, with slightly
different emphases, have been proposed in the litera-
ture to explain, for example, attitude measurement
[12], subjective well-being [13], or the way that
respondents answer survey questions [11]. These focus
more strongly on the cognitive processes involved,
whereas we focus more on the context of health state
valuation and wish to link such models to ﬁndings
regarding differences in values between respondent
groups.
The Stimulus (Object of Valuation)
In decision analysis or cost-utility analysis, utilities are
assessed of the clinically important outcomes of the
decision alternatives: the health states. The utilities can
be obtained from a representative sample of patients
who are experiencing the health state to be valued, in
which case the patients are asked to value their own
health. In most studies, patients who value their own
health are instructed to think of “their health in the
past week” or of “their current health,” and to indi-
cate whether they would trade off life-years (in a Time
Trade-off [TTO]) or accept risk (in an SG) to obtain
optimal health. Current health may be speciﬁed
further, referring to physical, psychological, and social
well-being [14]. When a societal perspective is used,
utilities are obtained from members of the general
public, of whom most will not be experiencing that
health state. The respondents are therefore requested
to value a health state description, or scenario, of the
state. Generally, health state classiﬁcation systems such
as the EQ-5D, or the Health Utilities Index, are used
for this purpose. They give a limited description of the
health state, usually in terms of functioning on some
salient dimensions. The EQ-5D scenarios describe spe-
ciﬁc levels of impairment in mobility, self-care, and
daily activities, and speciﬁc levels of pain/discomfort
and anxiety/depression. Respondents are asked to
imagine spending the rest of their life in the health state
described in that scenario, and are asked whether they
would be willing to trade off life-years or accept risk to
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Figure 1 A framework describing the process of health state valuation and mechanisms that play a role in this process.
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been devoted to the development of these health state
scenarios, despite early research in the ﬁeld of utility
assessment that showed the impact of framing of the
scenarios on the elicited utilities [15,16]. Llewellyn-
Thomas et al. [16] experimented with an individual-
ized scenario, asking cancer patients to indicate which
dimensions of quality of life were important to them.
They found that using an individualized scenario
reduced the amount of random error, compared with a
standardized scenario. In a later article Llewellyn-
Thomas [17] therefore proposed a general approach to
creating disease-speciﬁc scenarios for use in clinical
trials, to obtain utilities from patients for their overall
current status. She argued that if hidden effects of
scenarios would produce biased results and erroneous
conclusions, a comprehensive research program would
be needed. To our knowledge no such program has
taken place. We will illustrate with an example how we
nevertheless think the scenario may underlie part of
the difference between patients valuing the health
states that they are experiencing, and respondents
assigning utilities to these states as hypothetical sce-
nario. Jansen et al. [18] found that patients undergoing
radiotherapy assigned higher values to their “own
health” during radiotherapy than to a scenario that
aimed to describe their actual radiotherapy experience.
The authors ascribed this difference to the scenario not
matching the patients’ experience (“noncorresponding
description”). Insinga and Fryback [19], in a study
using the EQ-5D health classiﬁcation system, found a
similar difference between respondents’ valuations of
their current health (however, they conceived of it) and
their valuations of the EQ-5D scenario that by coinci-
dence happened to describe their own health. They
argued that “noncorresponding description,” which
they termed “lack of scope,” best explained the higher
values that respondents assigned to their own health.
They concluded that the health state descriptions (sce-
narios) of the EQ-5D are too sparse to describe certain
health states. We believe that lack of scope of the
stimulus will cause differential interpretation and inte-
gration of the information for healthy respondents and
for patients. This will be discussed in the next section.
Interpretation and Integration of Information
The next step is the interpretation of the available
information and its integration with existing informa-
tion, to make a judgment. Patients may interpret infor-
mation in the light of their experience, experience that
the general public lacks. So even if the health state is
adequately described, patient experience may color the
information. With regard to information interpreta-
tion in this context, much can be learned from
the stress-appraisal-coping paradigm, espoused by
Lazarus and Folkman [20,21]. They describe cognitive
appraisal as an interpretative and evaluative process
that focuses on the meaning and signiﬁcance that an
occurrence has for one’s well-being. The interpretative
part they termed “primary” appraisal, the evaluative
part “secondary” appraisal. In primary appraisal the
person evaluates whether he or she has anything at
stake in the occurrence. It thus ﬁts the information
interpretation phase. In secondary appraisal, the person
evaluates what, if anything can be done to overcome or
prevent harm, or to improve the prospects of beneﬁt,
evaluating coping strategies. This better ﬁts our judg-
ment phase. A range of personality characteristics,
including values, goals, and beliefs, as well as experi-
ence, may inﬂuence the process of primary appraisal. A
patient who has experienced restrictions to her func-
tioning, and has dealt satisfactorily with the impact of
these restrictions on her daily life, may appraise a
scenario as less threatening to her life than a healthy
subject who does not have such an experience. Findings
from research within this stress-coping paradigm may
thus be relevant to the difference in information inter-
pretation between patients and healthy respondents.
Framing of the scenarios may further inﬂuence such
differential interpretation and integration of informa-
tion by patients and by healthy respondents. Scenarios
are most often described in terms of the dimensions in
which the patient is not functioning well. Even if the
scenarios properly describe the negative symptoms
that patients experience, the patients themselves may
take other dimensions into account when interpreting
the information. It is conceivable that patients who
value their own health take, for example, more
nonhealth-related aspects into account, possibly their
happiness rather than their limitations, when deciding
whether or not to trade off life-years or accept risk.
They may incorporate constructed meaning [22], or
the personal growth that they may have experienced
after diagnosis [22,23]. Indeed, Tsevat et al. [24] found
that HIV patients were “highly valuing their life with
HIV, not their health with HIV” during utility assess-
ment. This would explain why many patients assign
high values to adverse health outcomes that they expe-
rience, despite substantial reductions in quality of life,
and why, generally, no more than 40% of the variance
in utilities is explained by patients’ HRQL [25]. If
patients value their life, not their health, social indica-
tors research is relevant, which has shown that health,
or satisfaction with one’s health, is never a strong
predictor of happiness, and that, of all aspects of
health, only mental health makes a substantial contri-
bution [26]. Studies in positive psychology show that
well-being is less related to the impact of impairments,
disabilities and handicaps, and more to positive
aspects such as meaning in life and goals [27,28],
which again points back to the primary appraisal
process described above.
The publication of the studies on framing by Kah-
neman and Tversky [29] has spawned much experi-
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mental research on framing. This research has
generally focused on gain versus loss frames, and has
demonstrated differential judgment in these two situ-
ations (see the next section). To our knowledge no
studies have aimed at elucidating the possible psycho-
logical mechanisms involved in the interpretation of
scenarios, and the impact of framing on this interpre-
tation. The ﬁeld may therefore learn from research
in health psychology, speciﬁcally that on primary
appraisal, and from research in positive psychology.
Finally, Schwarz [30] has shown that for information
interpretation, respondents may rely on contextual
information, especially when the questions pertain to
issues about which respondents do not have clear and
articulate answers. This may well be the case for utili-
ties, because such values do not play a role in everyday
life and will often be unfamiliar and even strange to the
respondent. The values may thus be constructed in the
process of elicitation [31].Most of the research referred
to by Schwarz pertains to multiple-item questionnaires,
where the respondents infer, for example, the research-
er’s epistemic interest from adjacent questions. Thiswill
be less of a threat in utility assessment, where such
multiple questions do not occur. Context effects on
judgment have been shown, however, and will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
Judgment
The judgment phase is the most encompassing phase in
our model. In our opinion most between-subject varia-
tion may be found in this phase, because of the various
personal characteristics that affect the judgment
process. This is not to deny that information interpre-
tation and integration also involve highly subjective
processes that are determined by such personal char-
acteristics, also because in that phase judgments
regarding the information are already being made, as
explained in the introduction.
Cognitive information processing is rarely exhaus-
tive and rarely guided by logical norms, but has to
reach a compromise between rationality and efﬁciency.
Memory is not perfect, and decisions often have to be
made about how to compensate for incomplete or
inaccurate information. Respondents use heuristics,
which are cognitive devices that enable the individual
to make efﬁcient judgments, by rule-of-thumb, that
require little effort and yield quite valid results most of
the time. Nevertheless, the price of such efﬁciency is
systematically biased judgments in some instances
[32]. We will therefore start this section with a short
overview of the problems encountered when such cog-
nitive shortcuts are taken. Next we will describe the
cognitive process of anticipated adaptation, and the
deﬁciencies inherent in this process. Furthermore,
social comparison processes are important in this
phase, and are discussed in a separate section. We will
end with aspects of affect and mood that may also be
of signiﬁcance in this phase.
Heuristics and Biases
A large body of research has followed the work of
Tversky and Kahneman [33] on heuristics and biases
and their impact on judgments. Tversky and Kahne-
man explain, for example, the impact on the respon-
dent’s answer of the availability of information, the
representativeness of the information retrieved, and
the context that is provided. These will have impact
mostly on the previous phase of information interpre-
tation. Other heuristics are more relevant to the judg-
ment phase and we will discuss those heuristics and
biases that seem most relevant to possible differences
in valuations between respondents.
A consequence of one such heuristic is the so-called
focusing illusion [8,34]. When imagining unfamiliar
circumstances, people focus narrowly on the most
obvious difference between those circumstances and
their current circumstances, and thereby misconceive
the impact of the unfamiliar circumstances. When
imagining life as a paraplegic, respondents mostly focus
on the wheelchair and all the things they will no longer
be able to do, not considering all the things that will not
change, let alone aspects that will improve because of
those circumstances, such as re-evaluations of areas of
their life. Ubel et al. carried out several studies attempt-
ing tominimize this effect by using defocusing exercises,
and concluded that it is difﬁcult if not impossible to
overcome people’s focusing illusions [10].
Furthermore, respondents have been shown to
experience status quo bias or an endowment effect, a
bias that may also impact health state utilities. People
value goods more highly once they own them [35].
This explains the ﬁnding that people are, in general,
less willing to pay to obtain certain goods than to
accept to give up the same goods. Salkeld et al. [36]
have extended these ﬁndings from the willingness-to-
pay literature to the discrete choice method. Respon-
dents had a preference for the status quo. They were
willing to pay on average $18 simply to have a bowel
cancer prevention test that they had already used
rather than a hypothetical test, which was similar on
all attributes but costs. It has not explicitly been
studied in health state valuation, but the effect can be
expected to hold in the same way. One may expect this
bias to be stronger for respondents valuing their own
health (which they “own”) than for respondents
valuing hypothetical states (which they are asked to
imagine “owning”). Subsequently, respondents valuing
their own health may be less willing to trade life-years
for better health, which leads to higher utilities. Such
an endowment effect may explain why Chapman et al.
[37] found that prostate cancer patients who used a
personal version of a scenario were less likely to trade
off length of life in a TTO task than patients using an
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impersonal version. The former version was the com-
monly used way of asking patients to trade part of
their life expectancy, which may have induced an
endowment effect. The impersonal version asked
patients to state which of two hypothetical friends
would be better off, and thereby may have avoided
some of the endowment framing. Another explanation
of these results, however, presented by the authors, is a
difference in compensatory decision-making resulting
from a difference in hot versus cold decision-making.
Therefore, we also discuss this study under the
response phase. Related to status quo bias, is the bias
caused by loss aversion [38]. People judge outcomes
relative to a reference point, and are more sensitive to
losses than to gains. Loss aversion will generally lead
to utilities that are biased upward [38,39]. In the TTO,
the loss in life-years looms larger than the gain in
health. The SG has been argued to be a mixed gamble,
in which the gain probability p must be extra high to
offset the loss probability 1-p [39]. Similar to the
endowment effect, it may be expected to be larger for
patients who actually are in the states they are valuing
than for healthy respondents. Stalmeier and Bezem-
binder [40] and Bleichrodt and Pinto [38,41] present
empirical evidence of the impact of loss aversion on
medical trade-offs.
Adaptation and Anticipation Thereof
A major issue in judgments of health states is the
process of adaptation, and people’s ability to antici-
pate an eventual adaptation to poor health. An impor-
tant conclusion of research in behavioral economics
that likely applies to utility assessment, is that humans
are poor in predicting how they will value a situation
once it is experienced, so-called “poor hedonic fore-
casting” [6]. Processes of adaptation appear difﬁcult to
anticipate. It has been suggested that healthy respon-
dents use a transition heuristic when valuing health,
that is, they focus on the time of entering a poor health
state and do not consider adaptation to that state. This
will result in healthy respondents undervaluing states.
Damschroder et al. [42] successfully used an adapta-
tion exercise preceding a Person Trade-off task, which
encouraged healthy respondents to consider their own
ability to emotionally adapt to negative events in
general, and speciﬁcally to having paraplegia. Respon-
dents randomly allocated to the adaptation exercise
increased the values they assigned to paraplegic states,
and the authors concluded that asking nonpatients to
do an adaptation exercise before giving quality-of life-
ratings may help close the gap in ratings between
patients and nonpatients. Their study on utility assess-
ment did not show a similar effect, however [43].
A discrepancy between healthy respondents and
patients may also arise from the fact that patients may
be unaware that their adaptation has an impact on
their current judgment. A study by Riis [44] showed
that dialysis patients estimated the mood of healthy
persons as much higher than their own mood, and
even as higher than the actual mood of healthy respon-
dents in the same study. They thus were unaware of
their adaptation to poor health. Gilbert [45] has
written extensively on “immune neglect,” the fact that
people are generally unaware of the cognitive mecha-
nisms that they employ to ameliorate their experience
of negative affect (what he calls “the psychological
immune system”). If they neglect this immune system,
they will tend to overestimate the duration of their
affective reactions to negative events. Gilbert even pro-
vides an explanation from the perspective of human
evolution: if people were aware of their capability of
such emotion-focused coping, they would not engage
in problem-focused coping (dealing physically with the
sources of their negative affect), and the species would
become extinct.
Furthermore, the process of secondary appraisal
from Lazarus’ and Folkman’s theory on stress,
appraisal, and coping, mentioned in the section on
information interpretation, might be different for
patients than for healthy respondents. In secondary
appraisal a person evaluates what, if anything, can be
done to overcome or prevent harm or improve pros-
pects for beneﬁt. The person, for example, evaluates
coping options. Coping options that will generate posi-
tive affect, and are therefore adaptive, are the infusion
of ordinary events with positive meaning, and positive
reappraisal [46]. Regarding positive meaning, evidence
suggests that under stressful conditions, individuals
may be more likely to bring about, note, or remember,
ordinary positive events. Positive reappraisal refers to
cognitive strategies for reframing a situation to see it in
a positive light. Some situations require relinquishing
previous goals that are no longer tenable and turning
to new, realistic goals. Patients may be more likely than
healthy respondents to use such active processes, with
which they already have experience. The “lack of
scope” of many of the scenarios used, as discussed
above, increases the likelihood of such differential
appraisal between patients and healthy respondents.
Patients will reframe their situation as a way of adapt-
ing to the situation, such that it does not correspond
anymore to the description in the scenario.
Finally, when patients are asked to value a treat-
ment they have experienced, they may unknowingly
restructure their internal representation of the treat-
ment state to justify decisions already made or to
reduce cognitive dissonance [47]. This may also be
seen as a type of cognitive adaptation. Such justiﬁca-
tion processes have been observed in direct treatment
preferences, where patients are asked to indicate the
beneﬁt they require from a hypothetical treatment to
be willing to accept it. Jansen et al. [48] found that
breast-cancer patients who underwent chemotherapy
were willing to accept this treatment for much smaller
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chances of beneﬁt, than patients not undergoing it. In
another study [49] they saw this difference in prefer-
ences even before treatment had started, indicating it
to be due to a psychological process of justiﬁcation or
to anticipated adaptation, as opposed to positive expe-
riences with the therapy itself.
Comparison Processes
Respondents in ill health have also been found to assign
higher utilities to hypothetical health states, not just to
their own health, than respondents in good health.
Dolan [50] found that respondents describing their own
health as poor assigned higher values to various EQ-5D
health states than those describing their own health as
good, a process he termed “valuation shift.” Valuation
shift thus refers to a change in the valuation caused by
a change in the status quo. Dolan found valuation shift
in cross-sectional data, as did Clarke et al. [51] and
Lenert et al. [52]. Saigal et al. [53] observed a similar
phenomenon in a longitudinal study in prostate-cancer
screening. Utility for hypothetical states rose in men
who showed a large decrease in quality-of-life scores
over time. Valuation shift might be explained by a
so-called “contrast effect.” Contrast effects arise from
social comparison processes, and originate in the social-
judgment literature on assimilation and contrast. They
refer to the effect of judging a target stimulus (in our
case: a health state) in relation to a context stimulus.We
may judge our present situation as more pleasant when
we have just remembered other pleasant experiences
(assimilation), but it is also possible that our present
situation will appear less pleasant (contrast) if com-
pared with the standard of a very pleasant experience.
Very positive information in the representation of the
standardwill result in a negative evaluation of the target
[54]. In general, the likelihood of assimilation decreases
as the distance between stimulus and context category
increases; extreme standards of comparison are likely
to produce contrast effects [32]. Mussweiler [55] pro-
vides a review on comparison processes and the role of
assimilation and contrast. Bleichrodt and Johannesson
[56] showed that Visual Analog Scale valuations were
indeed dependent on the context in which they were
elicited, that is, on the other health states included in the
task. Contrast effects may thus explain their ﬁnding.
Such effects are also likely to play a part in the EQ-5D
valuations of the general public, in which respondents
are ﬁrst asked to rank all states, before performing the
TTO task. It is not known whether patients may come
up with their own context stimuli, and moreover, it is
not evident whether assimilation or contrast is pro-
duced. But it is likely that assimilation and contrast
effects play a role in the judgment phase, and these have
not been studied in utility assessment under this name.
The literature in the ﬁeld of social psychology on social
comparison processes and the impact of these on, for
example, mood, self-evaluation, and life satisfaction,
may provide direction in this sense [57–59].
Affect and Mood
Finally, a large body of evidence exists on the impact of
mood or affect on decision-making [10,13,60]. Most
of this research is experimental in nature, and shows
that inducing positive affect by means as simple as
offering a candy bar, has an impact on participants’
decisions. In the ﬁeld of utility assessment, Isen et al.
[61] showed that persons in whom positive affect had
been induced (by offering them a small bag of candy)
showed a more negative utility for losses than did
those in a control group. This indicates that losses
seem worse to people who are feeling happy than to
those in a control condition. The utility functions of
the two groups did not differ as much, however, when
people were considering potential gains. If positive
affect induces loss aversion (and thereby higher utili-
ties) in more naturalistic settings too, and not only in
experimental conditions, it will only serve as an expla-
nation for the differences between healthy respondents
and patients if the latter are consistently in states of
higher positive affect. On the one hand, it is conceiv-
able that, to patients, utility interviews are more inter-
esting or gratifying because they pertain to their
situation. For healthy respondents the tasks are more
hypothetical and thereby perhaps more cumbersome.
On the other hand, arguments in favor of the inverse
point of view can be thought up as well.
To our knowledge, only one other study assessed
the impact of mood on utilities [16]. That descriptive
cross-sectional study among cancer patients did not
ﬁnd any effect. Nevertheless, Voogt et al. [62] found
that cancer patients who had less positive affect were
more inclined to exchange length of life for quality of
life than others. These authors did not assess utilities,
but their results imply a higher utility in the group high
in positive affect. It might be that respondents with
high levels of positive affect value not just their health,
but also value their psychological well-being.
Response
In this ﬁnal step of the model in Figure 1 we describe
ﬁndings related to the response stage, during which the
respondent, having formed a judgment, needs to ﬁt his
or her answer into the answering options provided. In
the case of utility assessment the answering options are
more involved, because they consist of a trade-off task
(which in fact again involves a judgment, but for the
sake of simplicity we deal with it in this section). This
response formatting process takes information from
cues provided, such as predeﬁned answering catego-
ries, to decide what is common for people and thus a
likely response. For the TTO and the SG, the use of
search strategies to obtain an indifference point has
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been shown to inﬂuence the response. Titration down-
wards, for example, results in higher utilities than a
ping-pong approach [63]. Matching, which is cogni-
tively more complex than choice bracketing (the ping-
pong approach) also leads to different results [64]. But
these issues are not likely to explain differences
between respondent groups, as long as both groups use
the same procedure.
In the response phase, some of the biases that have
been described for the TTO and the SG may well
operate in a different manner for patients than for
healthy respondents. The ﬁrst one is probability dis-
tortion, which refers to the fact that respondents do
not treat probabilities linear, but weight them. It is
described in Cumulative Prospect Theory [38]. People
tend to overweight small probabilities, and under-
weight large ones. The weighting function has been
shown to depend on the framing of the gambles (loss
vs. gains), and the impact of weighting could thus be
different for patients than for healthy subjects. Further-
more, loss aversion, referred to in the section on judg-
ment, is relevant in the response phase too, because it
also can be induced by the elicitation task. In the TTO,
subjects may perceive the trading of life-years as a loss,
and similarly the framing of the SG may lead to feel-
ings of loss. These biases and their impact on utilities
have been explained by Bleichrodt [39] and empirically
tested by Van Osch et al. [65]. If healthy subjects and
patients perceive the frame as distinct, due to it being
more hypothetical for healthy subjects than for
patients, this could lead to higher utilities for patients.
An example of a cognitive shortcut that patients
may use more often in decision-making than healthy
respondents, is noncompensatory decision processing.
Compensatory decision-making, in which one at-
tribute is traded off for another, is the basis of utility
assessment methods. It is cognitively demanding, and
when a decision is emotion-laden (“hot”), respondents
may resort to noncompensatory processes, such as
unwillingness to trade life expectancy [66]. Chapman
et al. [37] found that prostate cancer patients who
used an impersonal (“cold”) version of a scenario were
more likely to trade off length of life in a TTO task,
whereas patients using a personal (“hot”) version were
more likely to use noncompensatory strategies, such as
choosing the longest life expectancy. The “hot” judg-
ments by patients thereby resulted in patients assigning
higher values. As described under heuristics and biases,
part of this ﬁnding may also have been due to an
endowment effect.
An important phenomenon that also may play in
this response stage is so-called recalibration response
shift, which will happen to patients only. Patients
undergoing toxic treatment, such as radiotherapy,
often report quite similar HRQL from pre- to post-
treatment, despite objective deteriorations [67,68].
From retrospective assessments of their pretreatment
quality of life it appears that the patients change their
internal standards: after treatment they truly know
what fatigue means, and a similar score as pretreat-
ment on the post-treatment scale now implies more
fatigue. Recalibration has been shown for the Visual
Analog Scale [69]. If it translates to utilities too, this
may explain partly why patients score dissimilar to
healthy respondents.
Finally, respondents may wish to edit their answers
before they communicate them, because they may
want to conform to notions of consistency, social desir-
ability and self-presentation [11,12]. It may well be
that in an interview setting healthy respondents are less
concerned about trading off life-years (in a TTO), or
about a risk of immediate death (in an SG) than pati-
ents, because it remains hypothetical, whereas patients
may feel they are tempting fate by trading or even feel it
as an insult to their doctor or the health-care system.
Discussion
We have attempted to provide a framework describing
the process of health state valuation and the various
mechanisms that play a role in this process. A summary
of the mechanisms discussed is provided in Table 1. We
like to repeat the reservation we made in the introduc-
tion of the framework about the phases, which are not
as distinct as theymay seem from the table.Many of the
mechanisms described may operate differentially for
respondents with experience with the health state to be
valued and for those without, or for respondents in
Table 1 Summary of mechanisms that may play a role during
the phases described by the stimulus response framework in
Figure 1 to explain differences between patients and healthy
respondents
Stimulus Health state descriptions vs. experienced





Impact of contextual information
Judgment Heuristics and Biases
• Focusing illusion
• Status quo bias/endowment effect
• Loss aversion
(Anticipated) Adaptation
• Poor hedonic forecasting
• Unawareness of changes by patients












*Not likely to operate differentially for patients and nonpatients.
A Framework for Health State Utilities 83
good health and those in ill health. In most instances,
the direction will be toward a higher valuation by those
in ill health. With this model we have provided a link
between the ﬁelds of medical decision-making and
health economics on the one hand, and other ﬁelds that
in some way or another study the judgment processes
involved, such as decision psychology, HRQL research,
and social psychology, on the other.
Recently the ﬁeld of HRQL research has seen an
interest in the more cognitive aspects of HRQL assess-
ment that we described above (see, e.g., Volume 12,
issue 3 of the journal Quality of Life Research). This
interest followed the introduction into that ﬁeld of the
concept of response shift, by Sprangers [70]. Some of
the aspects described above, both under judgment
(e.g., valuation shift) and under response (recalibra-
tion), have indeed been described in the HRQL litera-
ture as forms of response shift [71]. Llewellyn-Thomas
and Schwartz [72] have categorized some of the biases
mentioned above in a response shift framework, in an
attempt similar to ours to help researchers decide
which aspects are preventing valid measurement.
Response shift has been deﬁned as a change in the
meaning of one’s self-evaluation of a target construct
(in the context of this article: the health state to be
valued), as a result of a change in the respondent’s
internal standards of measurement (recalibration), a
change in the importance of component domains that
constitute the construct (value change), or a redeﬁni-
tion of the target construct (reconceptualization).
Sprangers and Schwartz [73] and later Schwartz et al.
[74], distinguish response shift as such (i.e., the three
types of change) from the mechanisms that lead to
response shift, such as coping, social comparison, and
goal reordering. The question is whether conceptually
this distinction can be made. As the authors show in
their examples, recalibration is the outcome of a con-
trast effect, for example, when respondents compare
their functioning to that of others, or to that of them-
selves before treatment. As such, it can indeed be seen
as the result of a (social) comparison mechanism. But
is reconceptualization the result of goal reordering or
do both refer to a same process? Is value change a
result of coping, or is it a way of coping? Because the
authors explicitly use the term recalibration for a
respondents’ internal measurement scale, we have clas-
siﬁed recalibration as a more speciﬁc phenomenon of
the response phase. But in our opinion reconceptual-
ization and value change are processes of adaptation.
We believe that the response shift literature makes an
unwarranted distinction between mechanisms (e.g.,
coping, social comparison) on the one hand, and value
change and reconceptualization on the other. This dis-
tinction may be underlying the confusion in the litera-
ture as to whether response shift is not simply “the
emperor’s new clothes” [74], and refers to, for
example, adaptation.
The ﬁndings described have implications for utility
assessment both in the general public and in patients.
We brieﬂy discuss approaches to solving some of the
inconsistencies between patients and the general
public. Not for all issues described a ready solution is
at hand. Some warrant further discussion followed by
a consensus as to whether speciﬁc aspects of the valu-
ation process should be included or are truly biases.
Regarding the assessment of utilities from the general
public, a discussion of the health state classiﬁcation
systems such as the EQ-5D and the Health Utilities
Index is called for. These systems are widely used,
precisely because they provide reference values elicited
from the general public for health states experienced
by patients. It has, however, been argued that the utili-
ties from these systems may not be as “well-informed”
as would be desired [3]. We wonder why there has
been so little discussion about whether the utilities
obtained from the general public for the classiﬁcation
systems are well-informed and therefore valid? We
would like to argue in favor of opening the discussion
on the use of these systems, and the often low utilities
that they generate. For this purpose our framework
will be useful to decide which aspects of the systems
may warrant study. Lack of scope of the classiﬁcation
systems, as described in the section on the stimulus,
seems a factor that should be avoided. Adding new
health state levels or dimensions [75], or changing the
nature and tone of health state descriptions may be
useful steps towards improvement [19]. Furthermore,
Gold et al. [3] already argued that “techniques that
create a better understanding in the general public of
the experience of differing health states will be highly
useful in strengthening this ﬁeld.” Using adaptation
exercises as proposed by Damschroder [42] may serve
as such to overcome the poor hedonic forecasting of
humans. Regarding the assessment of utilities from
patients, in all steps of the valuation process biases in
patient valuations may be present as well, as appears
from the description of our framework. One has to
decide which mechanisms are important to incorpo-
rate in the valuation process, and which should be
avoided. Patients suffer from cognitive mechanisms
operating during treatment, such as justiﬁcation pro-
cesses, which should not be reﬂected in the utilities
used for cost-effectiveness analysis, and possibly not
even in those used for guideline development either.
Patients may also use more noncompensatory mecha-
nisms because of their emotional involvement.
Framing the task as a detached “cold” task may over-
come this problem. Furthermore, differences in patient
valuation that are due to differences in health or to
valuation shift may be corrected by the use of anchor-
ing vignettes [76].
A major question that has emerged from the
description of the framework is what it is exactly that
patients value in utility assessment, and whether this
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differs from what the general public values? Do
patients focus on their well-being, or even their hap-
piness, instead of on their impaired HRQL, and pay
too little attention to a possible impact of impaired
HRQL? Or do they simply take an impaired HRQL
in stride? A goal of health care is to improve patients’
HRQL, and one may argue that utilities should there-
fore reﬂect a valuation of this HRQL only. Similarly,
however, one may argue that healthy subjects over-
estimate the impact of impaired HRQL. A link of the
ﬁeld of psychological well-being and meaning in life
with medical decision making or health economics
until now does not exist. It may be created through
the assessment of individual quality of life [3,77], in
which respondents are asked to nominate themselves
the domains of life that mostly affect their quality of
life. In such studies, respondents often mention the
more positive aspects of life in relation to their
quality of life; health is often not given primacy [78].
Our article has attempted to integrate issues that
have as yet seldom been studied or presented in con-
junction, and thereby has pointed to many issues for
debate. It provides directions in deciding which aspects
of the valuation instruments and procedures should
perhaps be adapted, and which aspects should not be
deemed artifacts, but are true aspects to be incorpo-
rated. Valuations that are valid for the purpose at hand
will thus result.
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